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Abstract
Iong-standing immigration policy differences between Canada and Europe moderated
somewhat over the frrst decades of the post-War period, but subsequent to 1989 there was a
significant shift toward gteater divergenee. ThiB paper provides details on the widening
policy gap, its post-War oontext, and the economic, political, and ideological factors which
influenced the Canadian policy stance in particular. Canadian immigration policy in the
1990s emphasizes the admission of relatively large numbers of immigrants from around the
wsrld as self-financed, Sust in time'sources of skilled labor, advanced technology, and
entrepreneurial capital fire European attitude over this same period has, in contrast,
centered on further efforts to restrict inflows of migrants originating from outside Europe,
largely on the grounds that immigrants are threats to domestic employment security.
Although these widely different responses to economic migrants have some spill-over effects
on other aspects of international migration policy, such as family reunfication and asylum,
Canadian and European policies remain more similar in these areas. The rnajor
immigration policy contrasts between nations arise through significant differences in
political ideology, in turn related to the structure of interest groups and power relations in
society.
* Paper prepared for the Conference, nOrganizing Diversity: Migrati,on Policy and Practice .
Canada and Europe,o Berg en DaI, Netherlands, S-12 November 1995.
Developed countries in Europe, North America and etrsewhere are facing a number
of similar challenges to immigration policy in an era of trade and global transformation of
production. Stated briefly, economic globalization has two major impacts on rnigration
pr@ess. Firstly, it generates tremendous economic and associated political turmoil in
nations around the world, with particularly devastating impacts on incomes and
employment in poor countries with weak state social-security networks. In cases of nations
where ethnic rninorities or polarized social classes struggle over the distribution of scare
resources, the economic effects of globalization tend to increase tensions, conflicts and
violent confrontations. The resulting mix of unfavorable economic and political
circumstances leads to dramatically rising pressure for emigration from pmr countries to
wealthy, more stable nations. The movement is generated by a m,ix of economic and
political reasons.
Secondly, globalization also leads to inereased job insecurif,y regarding employment
in wealthy nations, and with this a rising fear that imnigrants represent a threat to well
being. In the face of rising international competition and falling profits, sorne producers
seek to contract cheaper workers, including undocumented migrants and members of ethnic
minorities facing discrimination who had few other opportunities. Others Lay-offworkers
and replace them with rnachines. And still others, close plants and relocate production to
other countries. The high levels of unemployment and the threat ofjob competition from
foreign-born workers tends to promote anti-imrnigrant sentiment, even racism among
certain minority faetions. The main features of contemporary international migration
are therefore strongly influenced by globalization. Ttrese features include: developing
countries are now a major source of international migrants, both legal and undocumented;
undocumented migration is most commonly directed to developed nations which are
proximate to developing nations; and unprecedented. numbere of migrants are asyluur
seekers. A fuller history of the affects of globalization would also comment on the migration
outcomes frorn fall of the Berlin WalI and the collapse of the former Soviet empire. These
momentous political events are widely viewed as arising from the economic failure of the
Soviet system in a competative, global eontext.
Given the sirnilar employment problems and migration pressures faced by developed
nations, one might expect a strong trend toward convergence in their international
migration policies. There are indeed some signs of convergence, particularly in responses to
asylum seekers. But policies in other areas, partieularly labor immigEation, have shown a
more complex picture, including even rising divergence, depending on which countries are
examined. Canada, along with Australia and the United States, for example, have tended to
maintain relatively high levels of immigration in the recent period, despite relatively high
levels of unemployment and at tirnes vocal popular pressure for reducing immigration. Ttre
Canadian case is particularly revealing of a state-led, assertive nentrepreneurialn and
"elitist" imrnigration policy, strongly supporting the immigration of relatively large numbers
of highly skilled workers, investors and experienced businessrnen and wornen, and of
making the immigrants thenrselves pay a higher portion of costs associated with their
selection and admission. European nations, in contrasf have entrenched their views that
immigrants are a threat to economic security in a context of unacceptably high
unemployment.
Why different countries take such divergent approaches to international migration
is a very large question. The present paper is limited to an examination and interpretation
of recent Canadian immigration policy initiatives, taking Western Europe as a contrasting
case in order to expand our undenstanding of policy influences. In order to manage even
this narrower topic, the analysis focuees on policy developments over the past l0 years or so
and interprets these at a nmaeron lenel in terme of general currents in national political
ideology and the relative power of different interest gloups in society. It is not that specilic
party politics dre inelevant, it is simply that they are eomplex and require a different level
of analysis. In addition, the macro-level currents of national development ideology in
Canada and Europe are rather broad, extending beyond particular par0ies.
fire paper is organized in four parts. Part I is a statement of the conceptual
approach to the analysis. Pafi2 examines the Canadian case, giving particular attention to
the way in which immigration policy has been shaped to fit within new national economic
strategies as these become overwhelmingly shaped by neo-liberal political ideology. Part 3
provides some comments on broad trends in Weetern Europe, both to show sorne similarities
with Canadian policy trends, as well as to accentuate the recent differenees and reasons for
them. Part 4 provides an interpretation of the contrasting cases and their implications.
Part I. Coneeptual Approach
knmigration policy is subject to influence from a wide variety of sources, including:
(a) law and constitutional rights, (b) national identity and other cultural influences, and (c)
state economic objectives and associated. national development ideologies that emerge
through political (power) brokerage. These are of course not entirely independent of one
another, especially over a longer period of time. Of the three, the last is the most dynamic
and responsive to challenges associated with economic globalization. Laws and
constitutional rights, as well as national identity, change more slowly and serve to moderate
policy change.
The term neconomic globalizationn is intended to refer to an inter related set of:
forces, including: (a) rnarket trends such as expanded trade and the rapid flow of
investment capital around the world to whatever enterprise or market shows the best profit.
to-risk ratio; (b) ry such as: decentralization of the production of
component parts to the least expensive manufacturing countries, assembly in low-wage and
low-tax zones, and global marketing of standardized products; and (c) associated oolicies of
national governments, such as: lowering tariffs on imports, reducing or stabihzing tax levels
to ir,nprove national cornpetitiveness; and so on.
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Econornic globalization is driven by the logic of 'flexible accurnulation" and
facilitated by the spread and political acceptance of neo-liberal ideology.l From the
perspective of neo-liberal ideology, the transformation of the global economic system is not
just some ngivenn, nor a set of business-inspired events to be resisted because of their
negative employment and other undesirable impacts on the welfare state. Rather the
transformation is a positive force from which all nations, societies, social gmups and
individuals will eventually benefit. fire supporting clichd is, nshort.term pain for long.term
gain.' Viewed more soberly, however, it is a process which in the short-term clearly benefits
certain nations and classes and social groups within them. The long-term outcomes for
those disadvantaged are not clear. Reflections on these trends have led to rising concern
from critics, including voices that one would normally associate with more consewative
views. Ttrese relate particularly to t'he widening social inequality .-between nations, along
ethic and "racial" lines, between the sexes, and between social classes.
The framework employed argues that recent evolution in immigration policies in
Europe, North Ameriea and elsewhere reflect the signilicant re-deployment of investment,
technology and labour that has taken place in the international system over the past two or
three decades. Under the rubrie of nadjustment" and nrefor[ln, nations and regional trade
blocs have promoted the new international system and adjusted to it by pursuing national
development strategies emphasizing the generation of wealth thmugh expanded trade,
increased exports, and reduced costs for national exports (often implying reduced taxes and
a smaller "staten apparatus). Econornic strategy in many countries gives particular
attention to lowering (or at least not raising) the tax burden on domestic manufacturing
I For a review of concepts and issues related to "flexible accumulation' and post-Fordist
production, see Part II in David Hawey, The Condition of Postmodgrnity. oxford:
Blackwell, 1990. Harvey's approach,like the one taken in this paper, eenters on economie
determinants but not to the exclusion of autonomous and reactive cultural forces and a
strong role for ideology. A theoretical diseussion of the approach taken and it€ relationship
to migration theory may be found in Alan Simmons, nMigration internationale et capitalism
global: examen critique des thdories,o in Human Gerard and Victor Pich6, eds. Manuel de
Sociolqgie des Po!-ulatioBs. Montr6al: Presses de I'Universitd de Montr6al, 1995.
enterprises, with an eye to export promotion, and lowering import tariffs, particularly with
favored trading partners, as a measure to promote economic efiiciency. Policy responses
also include reducing the national debt (again as a measure to keep taxes under control);
the training of national workers for "high endn engineering, product design, and finance
employment; and exporting low wage jobs by investing in overseas pmduction in those
developing countries which combine political stability and a relatively docile and skilled
labor force. The emerging international system is characterized by "just in timen production
and assernbly of goods for a global consumer market. Such goals and strategies have
widespread implications for policy in diverse areas, including employment, health and
education, as well as international migration, where the strong "efficiencyn values of the
system tend to encourage reducing state expenditures, decentralizing and privatizing.
Although the global system creates a broad set of common chal,lenges and pressures
for particular kinds of responses to all nations, it also provides options for diverse national
responses in particular policy areas such as immigration. The increasing divergence
between Canadian and European irnmigration policies, particularly as they concern workers
and other economic migtante, may be taken as a case in point. In both Canada and Europe,
economic globalization provides a strong stimulus for policy change and adaptation. But the
direction of change is open and subject to influences from legal-constitutional traditions,
from culture, and from political forces and associated ideologies. The following hypotheses
are relevant.
a. Constitutional and legal traditions have an important impact on immigration
policy, particularly with respect to issues related to human and civil (citizen) r'lghts. Certain
features of immigration policy are deeply ernbedded in constitutions, laws and international
agxeernents. This baee tends to provide stability for policy in certain areas. It particularly
resists new sources of influence on matters related to family reunification and political
asylum, whether these be culttrral or economic. While there are important differences
between countries within Europe and between Europe and Canada in constitutional and
legal status bearing on these matters, it may also be said that Canada and Europe share a
broadly similar Western legal and constitutional heritage, with Canada combining both
British and French traditions. It is therefore not surprising that there would be an
important continuing sirnilarity between Canadian and European views on family
reunification and the protection of refugees, and some recent trends toward increasing
convergence in asylum policy.
b. Cultural influences, national identity and associated values can also strongly
influence immigration policy. For example, Japan is resistant to all forms of immigation
except the repatriation of ethnic Japanese. This view reflects a cultural preoccupation, and
led the country to solve its labour demand problems over the past three decades by
'exporting jobsn through capital investment in other countries, mostly in Asia. Canada is a
contrasting case. Along with Australia and the United States-the two other nations where
planned immigration remains at relatively high levels-Canada has a multicultural
population and pluri-ethnic heritage. Hence, Canada faces adjustment to international
economic competition knowing that the nation (or at least imporr,arr*t sectors and national
political actors within it) is receptive to new sconomic migrants, provided that they are
perceived to cost little and to generate new wealth. Europe seems to fall in a third category.
Culturally and socially based opposition to immigration in Europe has been associated with
stmng expressions of nationalism and the positive value of ethnic/linguistic homogeneity by
some political factions. Yet, as a region of nations which accommodate considerable cultural
pluralism, general public concern in Europe is largely centered on the perceived threats to
job security posed by migrant labor.2 Eumpean statee have therefore opted for cutting labor
2BaH*in-Edwards and Schain, op. cit. p. 6-? present the findings from surveys from
various countries to conclude that oppoeition to third world origrn immigrants has been
spreading in Europe. In part, the results seem to confirn press reports and reinforce
concerns about the racist character of much anti.immigrant sentiment in Eumpe. Yet the
article also off6rs an extremely important and often ignored fittding. When asked whether
nationalityl race or religion of immigrants are disturbing to them, imore than 80 per cent of
Europeans find theee characteristics 'not disturbing'...n.The results suggest that pluralism
may be more deeply grounded in Europe than sometimes thought, and that anti-imrnigrant
sentiment for rnany is based on other criteria, such as challenges to job security.
migration, both to satisfy wider public concerns and as a way of at least partially cooling the
flames of extreme nationalist sentiment promoted by minority political. factions.
Ethnocentrism, xenophobia and racism play a role in policy formulation in both Canada and
Europe, but it is a secondary one arising from the challenge of small, vocal parties which
express anti-irnmigration arguments based on such sentiments. This said, the role of
nationalisrn is clearly stronger than it is in Canada--differences which reflect the relatively
more homogeneous linguistic and cultural background of European nations.
c. Last but by no means least, immigration policies are profoundly subject to
influences arising from the relative power of different interest groups in domestic politics,
and the formulation of national development strategy and ideology. This is perhaps the most
dynamic element in the eontext of the challenges of globalization. It is also an area in
which major differences between Canada and Europe may be observed.
Consider the Canadian side. From its birth as a nation, Canada has always had a
strong "outward looking perspective on national development. Canada saw itself as a small
country, dependent on international trade, foleign investment and immigrant labour.
While circumstances have changed and Canada is now a small but relatively wealthy
nation, it continues to rely heavily on foreign markets, capital and labour. The logic is
widely understood throughout the nation and is structured into the state and major
institutions.S tt ie therefore not surprising that the Canadian response to recent trends in
globalization would be to down-play possible negative effects of relatively high immigration,
while playing-up the possible positive effects. Further, the traditional counter-weight to
pro.immigration sentiment in Canada has been the organized labor movernent, but this
movement is currently in retreat, under an btoadside attack by political forces in the
context d high unemployment. This shifts the balance of power in the direction of those
3. Th" most p6werful interests often do not need to speak on their own behalf, under
eircunrstauces where the state internalizes their concerns and speaks powerfully for thern.
For related arguments and a case study of aetors, see Simmons, Alan and Kieran Keohane.
Shifts in Canadian Immigration Policy: State Strategies and the Quest for Legitimacy.
Canadian Roview of Anthropology afrd Sociologl, 1992: 29 (4) 421.462.
who want immigration, particularly if it ean be justified on neo-liberal economic
growth/efriciency grounds and at low cost. Equity considerations are increasingly ignored.
Part II. Canadiau Policy Trends
Canada was partially insulated from the 19?0s oil shock because it is a significant oil
producer, as well as an oil importer. However, in the 1970s Canada did enter into a period
of very slow economic growth. Income per capita seems to have scarcely changed in Canada
from the early l9?0s to the late 1980s.4 Canada also experienced a serious recession in the
early 1980s, closely linked to a parallel downturn in its major trading partner, the United
States, and to the difficulty of generating exports capable of competing in alternative
international markete.
During the l980s Canadian immigration policy not only began to converge with
European trends, but the basic determinants of this policy trend were also }argely economic
in orisin. In Canada in the 1980s, as in Eurrpe starting somewhat earlier, rising
unemployrnent led to increasing concerars about job security. With the recession, industry
had ample supplies of domestic labor and had lees reason to eneourage immigration. At the
same time, state leaders did not welcome any policy direction that might increase the
number of unemployed workers on welf,are, hence they too were luke-warm on immigration.
In consequence, polieies were changed to greatly reduce the inflow of immigrants in the
"independent wotker" category. Largely for this reason, overall immigration targets tended
to be lower cornpared with the previous decades in the post-War period. The fall in
irnmigration targets was particularly exaggerated in the early 1980s when a serious
recession and high unemployment combined to reduce independent workers to only 14
percent of all immigration and overall immigration targets to their lowest levels in post-War
history.S
4 Statistics Canada, 1994.
5 For a detailed review of the relationship between unemployment levels and immigration
targets in Canada oner the poot-War period, see Veugelers and Kliassen's paper in the
Canadian Journal of Sociology; 1994; 19(4).
Over the 1970s and the 1980s it seemed that Canada was shifting toward the
European policy stance: the inflow of workers was reduced over much of this period and
immigration policy focused more on facilitating family reunification and dealing with rising
flows of refugees and asylum seekers Three major elements in legislation over these
decades reflect this trend.
(a) The 19?8 immigration Act clarifred the differences between and the procedures
for selecting various classes of immigrants. For the first tirne refugees were explicitly
incorporated into immigration law. In addition, the rules of family immigration and family
sponsorship were clarilied and made more open. The Act created a legal entitlement for
imrnigrar'rts to sponsor their spouse, dependent children less than l9 years of age, parents
and grandparents. In 1980, the sponsorship provisions were expanded to create a special
category of Assisted Relatives bo facilitate the imrnigration of brothers, sisters and adult
children of migrants who wished to sponsor them. 6
O) In the context of rapidly rising inllows of refugee claimants in the latter half of
the 1980s, Canada responded with two pieces of legislation. one, Biu C-84 (1989)
established the Immigration and Refugee Board flRB) as a quasi judicial body to make
decisions on inland asylum claims and related immigration appeals. Ttre IRB was given a
mandate to deal efficiently with the large volume of new asylum claims, and to clear a
backlog of approxirnately 100,000 claims that had developed over previous years. How to
meet this large mandate while remaining fair to the refugees provided a quandary fsr the
government. It was the basis for an intense debate between humanitarian groups
6 B"htirr"s other than a spouse or dependent (minor) children had to apply in the
"Independentn'category, along with workers. Sponsorship gave them bonus points in the
assessment of their eligibility. Initially, in 1980, sponsored relatives received between 15
and 30 bonus points, when 50 points were required for entry. The measures where changed
in 1985 to provide trO points, wi,th a total of 70 required for entry. Further changes in lggg
gave sponsored migrants only 5 points.
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concerned with refugee rights and state oficials concemed with "bogus claimsn and the high
costs associated with the large inflow of asylum seekers.T
(c) A parallel piece of legislation, BiIl C-55 (1989) gave the state new authority to
stop claimants at the border if they had not previously eleared their elaim with a Canadian
consulate or embassy abroad; to return claimants to any "safe third countryo they may have
passed through before arriving to Canada; and to enter into agreements with foreign
g$rernments to stop asylum seekers from making simultaneous or Bequential claims in
different countries.S To date, this Bill has had little impact on practiee. Policy advisors
were unable to define which 'third countrieen would be deemed'saf,e" and this element of
the Bill has never been implemented. Claimants have continued to enter Canada and apply
for asylum from within, so the provisions of the BiIl in this regard did not influence total
inf,lows. Canada is currently exploring agteements that would allow claimants only one
review in a cornmunity of signatory countries, so this element may come into practice, but
only after a long delay.g
? Simmons, AIan; and Kieran Keohane. Shifts in Canadian Immigration Policy: State
Strategies and the Quest for Legitimacy. Canadian Review of AnthroBology and Sociolos.v;
1992;29(3,: 42r-452.
u In its original form, BiIl-C-56 included a proposal to grve immigration officials the
authority to interdict on the high seas the passage of boats suspected of canying
undocumented migrants to Canada. While this feature of the bill was deleted by the Senate
prior to passage by Farliament, it reveals the depth of concern felt by the state and the
lengths to which it was willing to go to conhol undocumented entry.
I Itt lat" 1995, Canada and the United Statee agreed to an arangement by which clairnants
would prohibited from presenting their case in both countries. Claimants would have to
present their case in the country to which they fust arrived. Ttre agreement is to be
formally signed and implemented in f996. Its impact will depend on how it is interpreted
and applied by the two countries, given that they have at tirnes taken quite different
approaches to the admission of particular eategories of claimants. About one third of
Canadian claimants arrived through the United Statce. Canadian refugee advocacy groups
have expressed concerRs that the arrangement could lead to a large number of asylum
seekers being refused in the United States on grounds that would not have led to their
refusal to stay in Canada. See Canada and US Release Draft Agreenenton Refugee
Cliaimants, News Release. Ottawa: Citizenship and hnmigration, November 2?, 1995. Also
see: Pact could thwart asylum-seekars. Globe and Mail (foronto), November 28, 1995: p. A9.
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Over the 1970s and 1980s, the immigration policy discourse within Canada turned
increasingly to issues of social, economic and cultural incorporation. this was the case
generally, and particularly so in Quebec. The predominantly (80 percent) Francophone
population of the pmvince of Quebec had a particular interest attracting immigrants able to
speak French or inclined to learn it after arrival. In the other provinces, the predominance
of English in an overwhelmingly English speaking North America has made immigrant
Ianguage skills a less central cloncern, although still important in immigrant selection and
the provision of post-arrival language training. Arising from this, there has been a common
perception that Quebec's concerns centered on language, national identity and assimilation,
while the rest of Canada is r.nore centered on plurality and ethnic relations in a
multicultural society.l0 h, fact, ignoring the occasional inflammatory statements of some
prominent Quebecers, it is clear that formal state policies in that province are strongly
pluralistic andvery sirnilar to those in Canada as a whole. Through its own Ministry of
Cultural Communities and Immigration, Quebec seeks to promote the contributions of
immigrants by ensuring their full access to employment and state services, while also
promoting integration within a pluralistic framework.ll Quebec, to this point unique
among provinces, has taken advantage of provisions in the Federal legislation which permit
provinces to take a joint role with tbe federal gwernment in the selection of immigrants and
l0 Differences in day-to-day public di*ouree between Quebec and the rest of Canada on
these matters, while probably exaggera,ted in the perception of obsenrers, are broadly
consistent with the assumed difrerences between France and Britain with respect to cultural
pluralism. See Weil and Crowley [1994, ibid"]rr The main policy views in Quebec promoting immigution, irnrnigrant integration and
cultural pluralism were developed in the late 1980s by the then Liberal government of
Premier Robert Bourassa. lJrese same policies were maintained subsequently by the Parti
Quebecois (PQ) under Premier Jaeques Pariseau, with clear indication that they will be
maintained urider the PQ with Lueien Bouchard as Premier. See Letjs Brrild Oudbec
Tpgethe.r: Visi,on. Qudbec Minist0re des Communautds culturelles et de I'Immigration du
Qu6bec, 1990. Also: L'integration des immigrants et des Qudbdcois des communautes
culturelles: doeument de rdflexion et d'orientation. Qudbec: Minist0re des Communaut6s
culturelles et de I'Immigration, 1991.
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a lead role in immigrant settlement programs.12 ftr Canada as a whole, multicultural
policies and the Adjustment Assistance Program, covering language training and
orientation to ineoming refugees and other irnmigrants, *'."" expanded over the 1970s and
1980s.
In the late 1980s and even more ao in the 1990s, several features of Canadian
immigration policy began to diverge from the drift it had followed over the period since
revisions to the Act in 1978. The new policy directions were either framed e:<plicitly in
terms of national economic and fiscal strategy, or else they addressed other matters not far
removed from such concerns. The broad thruet of policy change was to give higher priority
to (a) the role of international migration in increasing Canada's productivity and O)
lowering the costs to the public arising from all classes of international migration, including
family reunion, refugees, and asylum seekers. The specifrc new rneasures included the
following:
Total irnmigration. Targets were significantly raised. Since 1989, policy has
generally indicated that an ideal number of irnmigrants for Canada would be in the range of
one percent of the total Canadian population (currently about 29 million), but that the
actual intake in any year should be adjusted to take into account national absorptive
capacrty.lS To date, the adjustrnent has always led to a target at least somewhat lower
than the ideal. For the period 1990-1995, annual targete were initially set in the range of
250,m.14 The target for 1995 was later revised to a range: 190,000 to 215,000, while that
12 nre BiU is known the Cullen-Couture Agreement after the names of the two ministers,
one for Canada, the other for Quebec, who signed it in 1978.
18 ttis general appmach to irnmigration targets was first put forward by Barbara
McDougal, Minister of Employment and Imrrigration, in 1989. It has recently be reaffirmed
by the current.Minister (of Citizenship and Immigration, the new pordolio name) in 1994.
For the reaffirrnation, see Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). A Broader Vision:
Flan 1995-2000. Ottawa: Supply and Senrices Canada; 1994., p, 13.
14 See Ernployment and Imrnigration Canada (EIC). Managing Immigratiol: a framework
for-the 1990s. Ottawa: Employment and Immigration Canada; f992.
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for 1996 has recently been set at 195,000 to 220,00015 Th" latter figures include estimates
of the number of refugee claimants who were expected to have their claims approved.
These totals are somewhat higher than the average inflows in the 19?Os and much
higher than the targets in the early to mid-1980s. Ttrey are also high with respect to figures
for other immigrant receiving eountries. For example, in 1991 Canada admitted 205,000
inmigrants, a number corresponding to three-quarters of one percent of its total population
at that moment. The equivalent percentages for Australia and the Unitcd States were .?0
and .72,respeciively.16 Canadian targets are justified on a mix of objectives, including
economic prasperity, although it is understood that the latter is primarily related to the sub-
class of Economic Migrants (see below). The rising priority accorded to Economic Migrants
is evident in measures to attract immigrants in this class, and other specifrc measures to
create more space for this class within existing targets.
Econornic Migrants. Various policy measures have been introduced to increase the
priority to Economic Class immigrants. This class includes independent workers, business
immigrants, and entrepr€neurs. Policy evolution included the following steps:
(a) fire first step focused on independent workers, a class subject to selection
through the Canadian points system- In 1992, changes were introduced into the selection
procedure to increase the proportion of independent workers who had high levels of fluency
in English and/or French, and who had high levels of schooling Oeyond high schooD as well
as occupational skills that would insure immediate employability.l? In 1995, the Minister
announced an intention of further revising the selection procedures for independent
workers to give even more weight to knowledge of English and French (20 percent of total
points, up from 14 percent), to privileged workers aged 25-35 (rather than those 2l-44 as
15 See CIC 1994, ibid., and CIC, A Broader Vision: Immigration Plan. 1996. Ottawa:
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 1995.
16 See EIC 1992, ibid.
17 erc 1992, ibid.
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before), and to give visa ofricers discretion in assigning 16 percent of the applicant's score
based on their evaluation of motivation and "job readiness."lS These proposals have been
put non hold" in the face of widespread concerns expressel by immigration lawyers and
others who feel that the new regulations give far too much discretion to visa officers and to
subjective views.19
(b) A related step involved establishing a separate bureau within the state
bureaucracy to facilitate business and entrepreneurial immigrants. The special attention to
this class was justifred on the grounds that these imrnigrants have a huge positive impact on
the Canadian economy. The official framework for immigration policy planning issued in
1992 stated that immigrants entering in the Entrepreneur Class since 1986 had created
10,@0 jobs in the Canadian 
"coro-y.zo
(c) Policies have been established to increase the proportion of Economic Migrants in
the total inflow. It is understmd that desirable imnigrants are very unlikely to come
without being able to bring close family (spouses , dependent children, and parents). In
1994 Economic Migrants constituted 43 percent of the total immigration inflow. Ur,rder
current policies, this proportion is to increase to 53 percent by the year 2000.21
(d) Based on concerns that applications of Dconomic Immigrants may not be
sufficient to meet new targets, in the fall of l99l Canada began an international publicity
campaign.22 Advertisements were published in foreign magazines and newspapers extolling
the virtues of Canada. The advertisements also made clear what kind of immigrants were
18. CIC, Canada Changes Immigration Criteria for Skilled Workers. News Release. Ottawa:
Citizenship and Immigration, 1? November 1995.
rv Sariek, Lila. New immigfant selection rulee put on hold. Globe and Mail (foronto).
January 9, 1996: A8.
2o EIc, 1992, ibid. p. 18.
2t crc 1994, ibid.
22 S"" the newspaper article by LiIa Sarick along with a picture of a typical adver.tisement:
Lila Sarick, . "Canada strives to woo upscale immigrants.. Globe and Mail. Toronto; June ?,
1995: A1.
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sought: those who could speak English and French, had high levels of schooling, and skills
or experience to contribute to the Canadian economy.
Femil]' Class. In order to create space for a rising proportion of Economic Migrants,
policy changes have been introduced to decrease the proportion of Family Class. There are
major two sub-classes within the family class: (1) the immediate family consisting of
spou6es, fianc6(e)s and dependent children of principal applicants, and (2) parents and
grandparents. In addition, there is a minor sponsorship benefit for those applying in the
'independentn class who have a brother or sister in Canada (they automatically get 5 points
for this toward their total score). Some policy measures affect only one of these categories,
while others tend to simultaneously reduce the inflow in more than one..
(a) In 1992, the rules were modified to reduce the inflow of dependent children and
ofparents and grandparents. Over the period f988 to 1992 when state policies favored
family class immigration, never-married children of any age were cons,idered'dependentsn
and given automatic entry, subject to meeting health and security (police) checks applied to
all applicants. FoUowing the hydraulic logic of the systern, one consequence of this
expanded definition of dependent children was a rather large inflow of sponsored parents
and grandparents. It seems that immigrant families seeking the entry of a fairly wide
range of unmarried adult brothers, sisters, uncles and aunts organized first to sponsor their
own pagents and/or grandparents. Once the parents or grandparents had been admitted,
they in turn sponsored their unmarried children. To break this chain, in 1992 the rules
were changed to limit the definition of 'dependent children" to those who were unmarried
and under age 19. The result was a decline in the inflow of sponsored parents and
grandparents, as well as a drop in the inflow of dependent children.2S
(b) In 1992 the sponsonship prwisions for brothers and sisters of landed immigrants
were modified'to reduce the inllow of these family members. Prior to 1992, brothers and
23 EIC, 1994:8-9.
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sisters could apply for sponsorship from their siblings already in Canada. If the siblings met
the family income provisions of the rules, sponsorship would be approved. Brothers and
sisters with approved sponsorship would then receive l0 additional points to those they had
accumulated on other criteria (their age, language skills, schooling and occupation) applied
to independent applicants. In 1992 the rules were changed to provide only 5 points to
brothers and sisters. In partial compensation for this restriction, the 5 points were given
automatically to any brother or sister of a Canadian resident.
(c) Following policy measures announced in 1994, the proportion of Family Class
(consisting of spouse, dependent minor children, and parents and grandparents that might
be sponsored later) in the total inflow ig now fixed according to a plan and a priorrty
treatment of different categories of applicants. Under current policies, the Family Class
proportion is to fall frorn its 1994level (51 percent) to 44 percentby L997.24
(d) The immigration plan for 1996 ineludes proposals to increase the conditions that
sponsors must meet in order to have a family reunification request approved. Sponsors will
have to prove that they thernselves have not received any form of social assistance, housing
or income support from the state in the twelve months preceding their application. They
also have to demonstrate that they have a steady income flow sufrcient to meet the needs of
their family and those newcomers who they wish to sponsor. Under previous rules, a family
of 4 sponsoring a relative would need an annual income of $34,0@. Under the new rules, to
be inplemented in 1996, this will increase to $41,m0.
The outcorne of the above measuree will clearly curtail family chain-sponsorship.-
that is, a sponsorship process which begins with the admjssion of one family member who
then sponsors others who in turn sponsor still more, until there are no more surviving
family members in the country of origin.Z5 Restricting chain-sponsorship is not stated as a
24 ctc 1994, ibid.
25 S"jjua Akbar. nFamily Reunifrcation Multipliers for Canada, 19?1-86,n pp 65-82 in:
DeVorets, Don, ed. DiminishinE Returrrs: The Economice of Canada's Recent Immigration
Policy. Ottawa: Renouf Publishing for C.D.Howe Institute; 1994
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specific policy goal, but it is a major implied feature of the measures above, when taken
together. These various policy changes do not reverse the traditional value accorded to
family reunification in Canadian policy, but they significantly reduce it.
Refugees. No major changes have been inrplemented with respect to Canadian
refugee policy as such over the f990s. As before, official refugee admission targets and
selection procedures concern only those admitted through application from abroad. Most
are selected from refugee camps in countries of first asylum, with the selection based on
what might be called "relaxed" criteria similar to those used for independent workers. 26
The big policy concern rests with asylurn seekers, a separate class.
Asylum seekers. Official policy continues to search for ways to control and reduce
the number of asylum seekers who enter the country as visitors (or as undocumented
migrants) and then claim refugee status. As in the past, Canada makes frequent use of visa
requirements to control individuals traveling to Canada. In the 1990s several additional
measures were taken. Airlines are now subject to paying removal costs for passengers
aniving without proper documentation.2T They may also be subject to fines. Canadian
ofrieials have been involved in training airport staff at foreign locations in procedures to
detect falsilied documents. 28
CosLrecovery. New cost reeovery and coat reduction measures reflecting national
fiscal priorities were introduced into the immigration system in 1994.
(a) Under the new cost recovery measures, an immigrant family consisting of a
couple and two children will pay $3,150.00 (Canadian) for application and landing fees.zg
26 Tanya Basok and Alan Simmons. nRefugees in Canada: A Review of the Politics of
Refugee Selection,n pp. 132-157 in Vaughn Robinson, ed. The Global Refugee Crisis: British
aqd C,alradian Resoonses. U.K.: Oxford UP; 1998: 132-15?.
2? gill c.go.
28.
29 Setgio Marchi, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. "Changes to the fees charged
for immrgration sewices and changes to the Adjustment Aseistance Program (AAP).'
Statement (Press release), Citizenship and Immigration, Ottawa;ABril 15, 1994.
About one third of this is for application fees alone; this part is not refundable, hence only
individuals who are fairly confident that they will be admitted are likely to apply. The other
two-thirds is payable only by those who are admitted. Refugees (including claimants
admitted from within Canada) will also pay these fees. If they can not afford them, the state
will provide a loan to be paid after admission.S0 The costs are said to be less than actual
administrative expenses. Business migrants are charged a fee of $6,000 (Canadian) to have
their business proposal, an essential part of their application, reviewed. This is said to be
close to the real cost of conducting such a review.
(b) To further reduce the costs of programs to the state, since early 1994 refugee
claimants have been permitted to work while their claim is being processed..3l
(c) Efrorts are being explored to increase the contractual obligations of immigrant
sponsorship. The state estimates that social assistance (welfare, unemployment insurance,
etc.) paid to sponsored relatives (principally parents and grandparents) costs various levels
of government a total of about $?00 rrillion (Canadian) annually. 32 According to the
sponsorship agteernent, these costs should be paid by the family that sponsored these
relatives, but the state has no effective way of monitoring the system and ensuring that
contractual obligations are fulfilled.
(c) Some settlement programs have been reduced in scope. For example, support for
language training and orientation in the Adjustment Assistanee Programme (AAP) is now
limited to government sponsored refugees, a sub*lass within the Refugee Class that is
sponsored by the state. 33 The state argues that this prograrnme was originally targeted to
30 Folowing procedures which have been in place for some years, goveanent sponsored
refugees must also pay their own travel costs, though once again they can receive a loan
from the state and repay the amount later. ThiB is simply to note that charging refugees for
cpsts related ts adrrission is not entirely a new policy feature.
3l Sergio Marchi, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. *Iiefugee clairnants allowed to
work in Canada.n News Rglease. Government of Canada, Ottawa; January 24,1ffi4.
32 CfC. A Broader Vision. Oo cit.. 1994, p. 15.
88 Marchi, nChanges to the fees....n, op cit., 1994.
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benefit government sponsored refugees, such that the ruling is simply a return to the
original putpose. Over a period of years, the programme had been expanded by
implementing agencies to cover strong local demands from other groups of irnmigrants,
particularh claimants and sponsored kin of independent and other immigrants, who needed
similar senrices. Now these other classes of immigrants will not have access to programmes
they would benefit from.
Criminal migrants. In the past year, Bill C-44 was passed to deal with public
concern about rising crime among international migrants. The bill gives greater power to
immigration ofrcers to investigate fraud and international crime. It also authorizes the
removal of immigrants who have comrnitted serious erimes, and prevents refugee claimants
who have eommitted crirnes from appealing any negative decision on their original claim.
While these rneaeures explicitly focus on the objective of reducing crime in Canada, they
also respond to a widespread view among the public at large that jailing nforeignersn was an
undue burden on Canadian taxpayers.S4
fn sum, the ideal Canadian immigtant in the 1990s will be a self-financed, "just-in.
timen source of labor, technology or capital for immediate national econornic benefit This
ideal is a significant departure from previous Canadian immigation goals. It places a very
high value on language facility, current work slrills and ability to contribute to the
developrnent of advanced sectors of the economy. It reduces the obligation of the state to
take a long-term view that would require support for progra,mmes to encourage the
acquisition of skills among irnmigrants and their children after arrival to Canada. It reduces
the traditional support for family reunifrcation. And it is more restrictive in tone, if not in
fact, with respect to refugee claimants.
34 P.rb[c views in this regard have often rgnored the faet that the so called nf,oreigners"
facing deportation due to having been convicted of a crirne are most often legally resident in
Canada. Many are in faet naturalized citizens. Some may have arrived to Canada as
children and received all their sehooling in Canada.
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The current Canadian policy mix should probably be viewed as experimental and
subject to change. Pressures for change seem to be built into a series of internal and
external contradictions in the overall policy package. Foi example, the current approach
does not address the fact that selection of inmigrants in the Independent Worker class
based on strong language skills and employability will still not solve the need for language
training and skill upgrading for immigrants in the Family and Refugee classes. Cuts to
current language training and other progtammes will possibly slow the incolporation of
many migrants into the labor force, an outcome which clearly contradicts other policy
objectives.
Other questions may also arise leading to future changes in Canadian policy. For
example, what will the policy response be if immigrants with the righ,t language skills and
occupational training do not apply in the expected numbers? Will restrictions on
sponsorship of other family members be relaxed to encourage them to apply? Will fees be
lowered for certain kinds of priority applicants? WiIl other incentives be required to insure
that desired immigrants apply to Canada rather than to other countries, such as the United
States and Australia, that also compete for the same kinds of immigrant talent? And last
but not least, how will the public react to an elitist immigration policy in the c:ontext of high
structural unemployment and rising social-economic inequality?
Part III. West European Policy Directions
The following comments on broad trends in European policy are intended to
highlight the distinctiveness of the Canadian case, and to ehow that the conceptual
approach used in this paper applies to the European case, even if the actual policy directions
that emerge are often very different Canada and Europe. As European countries reveal
important differences in international migration policy between themselves, the analysis
focuses on broad trends and policy accords between groups ofcountriee.
2t
Recent reviews of immigration policy in Western Europe have drawn aitention to
the significant difrerences between eountries, particularly with regard to certain
constitutional and legal questions related to asylum, settlement and naturalization.S5
Although countries in the European Community do not have a unified policy on
international migration, it has been noted that national policies have strongly tended
toward n...a broad convergence of approach with a more intense nationalism." 36.
Different arguments have been advanced on the reasons for this trend. In part the
convergence seems to arise fmm parallel but separate learning-from-experience within each
country in the face of similar regional and. global circumstan...,g? and in part it may be
ascribed to joint policies arising thror.rgh inter-state ccnsultations and agreements. 38
The sudden shift in European policies in the mid-19?0 is generally ascribed to the
spin-of effeets of a major externally induced economie shock. Rapidly rising oil prices in the
mid-19?0s iriggered a series of related shifts in natisnal economic and fiscal strategies. A
rnoment of trrth had arrived, particularly fo'r ineffieient smokestack industries. As the new
energy costs forced closures, tax revenues declined and social welfare cosLs climbed.
Associated high levels of unemployment, the struggle for jobs, and rising tensions between
35 Immigration policy differences between European nations are highlighted in Daniel
Kubat, ed. The Politics of Migration Policies: Settlement and Integration.lte-First World
into the 1990s. New York: Center for Migration Studies; 1993. Further updates giving
gxeater attention to the tendency toward policy csnvergence in West€rn Eurcpe may be
found in Martin Baldwin-Edwards and Martin Schain., eds. The Politics of Immigration i4
Western Europe. Op cit.; 1984.
36 Philip, ibid, p. 88.
3? See the views of Patrick Weil and John Crowley. "Integratian in Theory and Practice: A
Comparison of France and Britain," in: Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, ede. Op cit., 1994:
1t0-na
$8. AI"t Butt Philip. Ibid., 1994. In c'ommenting on the Dublin and Schengen agreements,
Phillp further notes, nlt is ironic ihat at a tirne when national governments are keen to
[resistl..centralizing trends emanating from Bmssels, national gwernments ehould find
themselves agreeing to cede ground wer irnnigration policy to the Community..' (88).
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the public and ethnically distinct immigrant communities soon led to the termination of
policies favoring labour migration. 39
Despite econsmic recovery in many European nations in subsequent years, the
economic climate is one in which jobs are viewed as scarce and job-security under threat.
These continuing concerns are central sources of influence on the continuing convergen[
trend in Europe with respect to immi$ation policies. The broad policy trends for Western
Europe may be summarized as follows:
Total inflow. In the 1970s, gwernments throughout Western Europe sought to
reduce total inflow by restricting labour migration from outside the region. This measure
led to reduced overall immigration in each of the countries concerned, but the downward
trend in overall arrivals was moderated by continuing inflows through family reunion and
rising inflows of refugees, many fmm Eastern Europe.40 Some nations tried to further
reduce net-inflows in the 1970s and early 1980s by encouraging the repatriation of guest
workers from Turkey, Morocco and other developing countries, but these policies did not
lead to large numbers of migrants returning home. 4l
Labour migration. Although labor migration to Europe was abruptly terminated by
new policies introduced in the mid-1970s, some authorized flows of workers, including visa-
workers on short contracts, continued. For example, France continues to receive about
50,000 temporary agricultural workers annually, mostly from North 46is.. 42
Eflmill' migration. Previously established regulations concerning family reunion
generally stayed in force in Europe. At the same time, rather large immigrant communities
had grown up within Europe over the 1950s and 1960s. When labor migration was
39 S"" Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, Chapter 1,'Introduction," in their edited book, The
Politics of Immigration in Wester,n Europe. Op cit., 1994.
40 gaHtoin-Eilwards and Schain, Op cit., 1994, pp 2-5.
41 See Proceedine of the Expert Group on Population Distribution. Migration and
DeveloornenL Hamrnamet. Tunisia. March 21-25. 1988. New York: United Nations, 1994.
42 Bald*in-Edwards and Schain, Op cit., Ch l, p 10.
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terminated, imrnigtants used the existing family reunion rules to spons,or kin from
abroad.43
Refugees. Refugee admission in Europe, as elsewhere, is largely based on law,
constitution, and international agreements. These sources of policy influence are resistant
to change, or at least to rapid change.& At the same time, circumstances afrecting refugee
flows in the world underwent a radical transformation. Large flows of refugees and asylum
seekers began to enter Europe, first from developi4g countries, particularly in Asia, then
from Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet empire. Refugees from certain
countries entered by agreement (e.g., Vietnam). Clairnants, on the other hand, were
received with a much more variable and restrictive response. Procedures set in place in
Europe to assess claims have typically revealed that three-quarters or more of asylum
seekers do not meet acceptance standards. 45 However, for legal and constitutional reasons,
it has not always been possible to deport thoee rejected and this remains a focus of policy
concern.
IlleEal migrants. fire main focus of policy in this area has been on a particular
category of illegal migrants, namely illegal migrant workers. It is difficult to control the
entry of undocumented workers for various reasons, including the fact that they are often
welcomed by employers looking for cheap labor. Undocumented workers themselves may
prefer to maintain an illegal status, at least if this improves their job prospects.S In order
43 BaH*itr-Edwards and Schain, Op Cit., Ch l, pp 2-5.
44 In tggg the French Constitutional Council deterrrined that parts of the Dublin and
Schengen Agreements violated the Geneva Convention and certain aspects of the French
Constitution. In consequence, France decided to amend its constitution, a decision which
prwoked divisions in all political parties. See p. 10 in Balwin-Edwards and Schain,
nlntroduction,n 1994,, Op cit Chapter 1: 10.
45 soPung, annual reports.
46 Itt examining the Italian case, John Veugelers notes an instance where undoeumented
migrants werti offered the chance to get a work pemlit. Many rnigrants chose not to accept
the offer. Employers are obliged to pay higher wages and social security ts workers with
legal documents. As a result, some migrants felt that they would. be rnore employable
without docurnents. Fohn Veugelert. nRecent Immigration Politics in Italy: A Short Story,'
pp. 33-49 in: Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, eds.,1994, op cit.
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to discourage employers from hiring undocumented migrants, many European countries
have legislated fines and other sanctions for frrms who have illegal migrants on their
payrolls. A detailed study of these measures suggests that the sanctions are somewhat
effective, but still leave large holes for employgrs who wish to hire illegal foreign workers,
largely due to inefficiencies and other problems in state enforcement.4?
Controls . In addition to the limitations referred to above, Eumpean nations have
extensively used visa controls to restrict movement of migrants from those eountries known
to be the origin of illegal migrants and unsuccessful refugee claimants. They have also
entered into two well-known collective agteements: Ttre Dublin Convention (1990) to
prevent multiple or successive claims for asylum by the same individual in different
European countries, and the Sehengen Agreements (1985 and lgg0) to establish a cornmon
ftontier for Eumpe.€
Settlement nolicl'. As the communities of ethnic rninorities in Europe have grown--
first through labor migration, then through family reunification and reproduction--the
region has struggled with a paradox. It defines itself as a regional bloc without
immigration, in spite of the fact that it receives large numbers of immigrants and contains
large and growing ethnic-minority communitiee.49 The politics of immigration in Europe
over the past twenty years have centered on this paradox and its relationship to questions of
national identity and incorporating minorities. The intensity of the population debate on
these issues undoubtedly reflects the fact that nationality and national identity are gripping
matters in nation states facing reorganization through the forces of regional integration and
globalization.
4? Mark J. Miller, nTswards Understanding State Capacity to Prevent Unwanted
Migration: Employer Sanc.tisns Enforcement in France, 1975-1990." Pp. 141.16? in Baldwin.
Edwards and Schain, 1994, oo cit.
48 S"* the commentary on these agreements by Philip, 1994, Op cit.
4949 15" growth of these communitiee takes place largely through natural increase, in
addition to continued immigration.
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Although the policy measures and objectives vary from one country to another,
Western European nations have by and large developed policies to assure the incorporation
of ethnic minorities and immigrants. The policies include the provision of rights to
schmling of children and other policies, even in cases (such as Gerrnany) where law makes
naturalization particularly difficult. The objectives are generally stated in non-economic
goals--to improve 'race relations" (the focus in the UIQ, to facilitate social incorporation (the
concern in Gernrany), or to foster'assimilation' (the objective in France)50--bot the policies
themselves look very similar to those in Canada. lhe difference is that in Canada the same
policies are justified to a much greater extent on economic objectives, namely ensuring
productive roles for immigrants and reducing irnmigrant welfare dependency.
In sum, the various iurrnigration debates in Europe over recent years began with a
clear economic concesr arising from lack of competitiveness in the emerging global system.
fire first step was to stop labor-migration on the assumption (undoubtedly correct) that the
kind of migrants who had been admitted under the "guest workern programmes and other
mechanisms (mostly laborers and semi-skilled factory workers) were no longer required. No
consideratisn was given to whether immigration of other kinds of economic migrants might
have positive benefits. Subsequently, the poliey debate and policy development has shifted
to questions of humanitarian and legal rights, and to matters of national identity and
incorporation. Yet the latter issues have been framed by circumstances arising frorn
economic globalization, particularly by the politics ofjob-scarcity and social conflict over
limited resources. firis said, it is not correct to ascribe all social conflict between
immigrants and non-irnmigrants in Europe to job competition between these groups.
Schnapper has argued, for example, that the rise of anti-immigrant sentirnent in Germany
50 For a comparison of incorporation policies in Britain and France, see Weil and Crowley,
1904, op cit.
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can in part be ascribed to scape goating by a majority community which is itself grappling
with questions of identity and belonging, as the two Germanys struggle to come together.Sl
Discussion
Taking a broad historical perspective, it might be said that Canada and Europe have
very long-standing fundamental similarities in their attitudes toward humanitarian and
constitutional aspects of immigration, as these relate to family reunification and refugees.
firey also have equally long.standing basic difrerences in their attitudes toward workers
and other economic migrants, arising from very different historical circumstances and
national development ideologies.
The period frorn the 1950s to the mid-1960s was one of an increased converge in
imrnigration policy between Canada and Europe. This was due to three temporary
circumstances. Firstly, family reunification and refugee rrovements were largely taking
place within Europe, or between Europe and countries of heavy European settlement
orerseas (Australia, Canada and the United States). The cornmon values and constitutional
heritage among Western countries facilitated these morrements. Western European
countries and the former Eurryean settlement countries overseas were all major recipients
of migrants from other countries, under rules they all understood and reciprocated.
Secondly, the nations of Western Europe as well as the overseas countries of
settlement were all experiencing rapid economic growth and high labor demand- This was a
corRmon historical circumstance for Canada and the other overseas immigrant receiving
nations. It was however a temporary cireumstance in Eumpe, and soon came to an end.
Economic rnigrants were popularly viewed as job-thieves and threats to welfare and
security, as well as to ethnie and linguistic homogeneity.
51 Dominique Schnapper. nThe Debate on Immigration and the Crisis of National ldentity,n
pp. 127-139 in: Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, eds.; Op cit., 1994.
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There was also a period of increasing convergence from the late 1970s to the mid-
1980s. Faced with the early challenges of globalization and a major economic downturn in
the early 1980s, Canada responded by dramatically lowering its intake of immigrant
workers. For a period, it appeared that Cana{awas moving in the direction of European
policies after the mid-1960s, but the Canadian policy trend proved to be short lived. By the
second half of the 1980s Canada had returned to its traditional policy of admitting relatively
large numbers of workers, and small but increasing numbers of investment and business
migrants, on the grounds that they would contribute to national development.
The challenges of globalization tended to sharpen the long-standing differences in
attitude to immigration between Canada and Europe. They also senred to point out some of
the limitations of common constitutional heritage when providing a similar treatment for
refugees and asylum seehers. The major differences between Europe and the overseas
immigrant receiving nations, including Canada, arising from the preceding trends are well
known. Europe sought to tighten its controls on foreign job seekers. It also tended to reject
a higher proportion of claims for asylum, particularly those from non.Europeans.
Contrasting with this, Canada and the other overseas countries of settlement tended to
maintain traditional levels of immigrant inllow. They also began to vie with one another to
attract overseas entrepreneurs and business immigrants, particularly those from the Middle
East, Hong Kong and other parts of Asia.
Within these comparisons, the recent evolution of Canadian policy provides an
illustration of the way in which political ideology and historical eircumstances combine to
promote a distinctively assertive nentrepreneurial" immigration policy. The distinctive
features of Canadian policy arise out of the history of Canadian incorporation into the
internat'ional economie systern and the way this history combined with current ideological
trends. Canada as a country built through settlement from abroad had to develop strategies
for multicultural accommodation. Beginning as a small economy, dependent on capital
imports and erAort-led growth, the nation developed an outward looking perspective in
28
various matters. The result was the development of a nation with a relatively high
tolerance for immigrants and for cultural pluralism. (Ihe term "relatively high' is
intentional, to take into account the fact that public opinion in Canada tends to the view
that immigration levels are too high, while at ihe same time specifrc influential interesi
groups--ethnic communities, human rlghts organizations, and business lobbies-.encourage
immigration related to their interests and, hence, put upward pressure on overall targets.)
In this shifting balance of domestic views on immigration, the Canadian state has
historically responded to the expression of powerful national interests favoring immigration,
while atternpting to placate concems that immigration will erode jobs and economic
security. In this regard, both major political parties of the 20th century (the Conservatives
and the Liberals) have tended to take very similar approaches to immigration: generally
promoting the kinds of migran,ts which they felt would benefit the Canadian economy and
national development more generally, while moderating the total volume in periods of high
unemployment, and incorporating other policies designed to please and help integrate
ethnic communities which developed through the immigration process. This so called ntap-
on, tap-off approach to immigration, linking immigration targets to unemployment levels,
operated coherently up to 1989. Subsequently, the pattern has shifted to one where
immigration targets are established with less attention to annual variation in
unemployment,
fire 1990s constitute a watershed period in Canadian immigration policy. Over the
poet-War period until 1989, organized labour and the publie more generally tended to
balance the nentrepreneurialn eide of state immigration policy by demanding that in{lows be
curtailed during periods of high unemployment. the state accommodated by lowering the
intake of workers, while maintaining (or wen increasing at times) the in{lsrv in the family
reunifrcation chtegory, knowing that this would please eertain constituencies (ethnic
communities) and indirectly furnish workers and provide for the demographic objectives of
policy (sponsored kin, Iike evetyone else, tend to work and to pr@reate, even if they are not
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chosen on criteria related to these purposes). The rapid loss of manufacturing capacity and
associated job loss hit Canada in 1989 and which continues (in the face of a still jobless
economic recovery) has signifrcantly weakened the power of organized labor, and removed a
major moderating force in immigration poliey, as well as on policy in other areas. This has
led to a fundamental shift in the rationalization of immigration objectives.
Economic objectives currently take a more explicit and dominant place. The impact
of immigrants on employment and the costs of state programmes continues to be a policy
concem, but the upper limits on inflow are less oriented to unemployment figures while new
criteria have emerged. The general guideline, put in place most vigorously in 1989 and
subsequently, is that annual immigration should optimally be about I percent of the
national population and that it should be planned in terms of long-term goals, as well as
adjustments to refloct specifrc circumstances in any given year. Annual imrnigration targets
are adjusted downward from this high general baseline, rather than upward from a zero
base. T.Ile targets, moreover, are increasingly rationalized in terms of (a) the immigrants'
ability to pay for their own admission costs, and (b) the capacity of a downsizing state to
select the kind of immigrants it wants and to monitor the conditions of their admission (such
as the fulfillment of business-plans and investments or sponsorship criteria). State policy
statements and parliamentary reports stress the economic contributions of immigration.
These senre to deflect criticism on the increasingly elitist character of the new inflows and
the policies whieh downgrade the role of family reunification in nation building. While the
curent policies are being introduced by a Liberal government, they are completely
consistent, with the policy drift and ideology of the previous Conservative government.
Various concerns arise from an examination of Canadian and Eurorpean policies from
the perspective developed here. National irnmigration policies all seem rooted in ideology.
Ttrey also revdal deep concerns with maintaining, even reinforcing, established political,
power and s,tatus relationships in society. Econornic ideology is a key factor in the
promotion and public rationalization of irnmigration policies. Since those economic
